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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CHOOSING A MARITAL DEDUCTION FORMULA CLAUSE
In the early years after the introduction of the Federal estate tax
marital deduction in 1948, a dispute arose over whether a formula or a
non-formula clause should be used to obtain this tax benefit.' Due to
a preponderance of advantages, the formula clause has gained general
acceptance2 and the dispute has shifted to a discussion of which of the
various types of formulas should be utilized.
Three general types of clauses will be examined here as applied to
the hypothetical estate of Guildenstern. This article is not intended to
resolve the dispute as to which is "best", however, as there is no single
formula clause applicable to all situations. Rather, it is hoped that by
examining the advantages and disadvantages of a few of the most
commonly used clauses in relation to a given fact situation, a practical
reference will be established for the practitioner who is not always able
to explore the intricacies of the various formulas, and at the same time,
provide citations indicating where more detailed information can be
found when necessary.
BEFORE THE VOYAGE
Before his fateful voyage, Guildenstern sought estate planning ad-
vice with an estate made up at that time as follows:
Owned Solely by Guildenstern
Life insurance (payable to his wife so as
to qualify for the marital deduction) $ 60,000
Marketable securities 55,000
Guildenstern Corporation stock 100,000
Tangible personal property 10,000
$225,000




Residence (purchased with his money) 40,000
95,000
Gross Estate $320,000
The marital deduction formula clause is defined as "a provision in
a will which leaves property to the surviving spouse of the testator
3-Trachtman, Leaping in the Dark; More Adventures with Marital Deduction
Formulae, 93 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 922 (1954); Sargent, To Each His Own,
93 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 933 (1954).
2Lovell, Administering the Marital Deduction-a Summary of Five Years'
Experience, 92 TRuSTS AND ESTATES 812 (1953); Cantwell, Ten Years of
Experience with the Marital Deduction, 36 DICTA 197, 201 (1959) ; Durand,
Draftntanship: Wills and Trusts, 96 TRusTs AND ESTATES 871, 872 (1957).
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either directly or in trust which is so phrased that the gift (1) qualifies
for the marital deduction allowed for such gift under the Federal estate
tax law, and (2) is just large enough to entitle the estate to precisely
the amount of the maximum marital deduction."3 A clause that pro-
vides for an outright gift to the wife of one-half of the adjusted gross
estate less those assets passing to her otherwise, would satisfy this defi-
nition. However, such a clause is not totally self-executing and must
always be co-ordinated with the testator's estate.
For instance, in the estate of Guildenstern, if we estimate adminis-
tration expenses to be $20,000, nothing would pass to the widow under
a formula clause since property worth $155,000 (life insurance of
$60,000 and joint property of $95,000), which passes automatically to
her, would exceed the maximum marital deduction of $150,000. This
situation, all too common when the client seeks estate planning advice,
suggests, (1) that immediate adjustments must often be made in order
to effectively utilize a marital deduction formula clause, and (2) that
frequent review of a client's estate plan is always advisable in order to
keep the clause prospectively operative in light of changes in the estate
subsequent to the execution of a document containing such a clause.
The adjustments to be made here are that the life insurance will be
made payable to the testamentary trustee,4 all the joint property, except
the residence, will be placed in the sole name of Guildenstern,s and
administration expenses will be assumed to be $20,000, all of which
would leave an estate comprised as follows:
Owned solely by Guildenstern
Bank accounts $ 10,000




Guildenstern Corporation stock 100,000
Tangible personal property 10,000
$280,000
Owned jointly with his wife
Residence 40,000
Gross Estate $320,000
less: Administration expenses 20,000
Adjusted Gross Estate $300,000
3 Cox, Types of Marital Deduction Formula Clauses, 15 N.Y.U. INsT. oN FED.
TAX. 911 (1957).
4 Wis. STAT., §206.52 (2) (1959).
5 State and Federal gift tax consequences should not be overlooked in any
reshuffling at this stage in the estate plan.
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It is in regard to this estate that we shall examine three sample
formula clauses, assuming (1) that the tangible personal property is
specifically bequeathed to the wife, (2) that the estate is to receive the
benefit of the full marital deduction, and (3) that in all cases, the exe-
cutor is empowered to make distributions in cash or in kind.
AFTER THE VOYAGE
A. PECUNIARY MARITAL GIFT SATISFIED AT DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
VALUES
The first clause which we shall assume to have been used in the will
of Guildenstern is the pecuniary marital gift with the executor having
the right to satisfy the gift with assets distributed in kind, which assets
shall be valued as of the date of their distribution. The following is
such a clause:
If my wife survives me, I hearby give and bequeath unto
as Trustee, an amount equal to the maximum estate tax marital
deduction (allowable in determining the Federal estate tax pay-
able by reason of my death) diminished by the value for Federal
estate tax purposes of all items in my gross estate which qualify
for said deduction and which pass or have passed to my said
wife (the words "pass or have passed" shall have the same mean-
ing as such words shall have under the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code in effect at the time of my death) under other
provisions of this will, by right of survivorship with respect to
jointly owned property, under settlement arrangements relating
to life insurance proceeds, or otherwise than under this bequest.
In making the computations necessary to determine such amount,
the final determinations in the Federal estate tax proceedings shall
control.6
Under this clause, unless a contrary provision appears in the will,
property distributed will be valued as of the date of distribution, so
that Guildenstern's widow would receive $100,000 from her husband's
estate at the time of its distribution, either in cash or in assets having
a value at that time of $100,000, this amount being arrived at by sub-
tracting from the maximum marital deduction of $150,000, the joint
residence of $40,000 and the tangible personal property of $10,000, the
latter two assets having passed to the wife otherwise than under the
bequest. Such a gift is a general legacy7 and as such, is subject to the
prior payment of specific legacies but would be fully satisfied before
the residuary legatees would take. A general legacy, if not in trust,
6 Casner, Haw to Use Fractional Share Marital Deduction Gifts, 99 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 190 (1960). The last sentence of this clause does not au-
thorize distribution at Federal estate tax values but relates only to the com-
putations of the adjusted gross estate.
7 In re Reben's Will, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 228 (1952) ; In re Lewis' Will, 115 N.Y.S.
2d 791 (1952). Such a gift would still be a general legacy even if it were
to be made up out of residue. REv. RUL. 60-87; 1960-10 I.R.B. 18.
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does not entitle the legatee to interest during the ordinary period of
administration unless a contrary intent is manifested in the will.' When
such a gift is made without specific provision that the gift is to receive
income during administration, caution should be exercised so that the
executor is not in any way "authorized or directed to delay distribution
beyond the period reasonably required for administration of the dece-
dent's estate", as such a provision may defeat the marital deduction. 9
This form of marital gift also does not 'hare in any appreciation
or depreciation of the probate assets during the period of administra-
tion and would be paid in cash if the power to make distributions in
kind were not specifically included.'0 Neither would the wife share in
any appreciation or depreciation if the executor is given the power to
satisfy such a legacy in kind since, as mentioned above, the assets so
distributed will be valued at their values on the date of the transfer."
The amount of marital gift could be altered, however, should the
assets change in value during the administration and the executor elect
to choose the alternate valuation date. Assuming Guildenstern's pro-
bate and trust assets of $260,000 (after expenses) increased in value,
such that on the alternate valuation date they became worth $360,000,
the maximum marital deduction would then be $200,000 and the widow,
under the formula, would be entitled to a gift of $200,000 less $50,000,
or $150,000 from the estate. Such an election, although incurring a
higher Federal estate tax, is not at all unlikely, especially where the
widow serves as executrix.1
2
Even though determined by a formula, the widow's claim against
the estate is for a fixed and definite dollar amount and to the extent
the fair market value of any property distributed in satisfaction of the
claim exceeds the fair market value thereof on the date chosen for
Federal estate tax purposes, capital gains would be realized by the es-
tate.'8 In such a situation, the transferee is regarded as having acquired
8 3 Scor, TRUSTS §2342 (2d Ed. 1956). For the ordinary period of adminis-
tration in Wisconsin, one year, see Estate of Onstad, 224 Wis. 332, 271 N.W.
652 (1937) ; Shupe v. Jenks, 195 Wis. 334, 218 N.W. 375 (1928) ; Estate of
Hoehnen, 233 Wis. 645, 290 N.W. 137 (1940), and Wis. STATS., §313.13 (1)
(1959).
9 "An interest is not to be regarded as failing to satisfy the conditions set forth
in paragraph (a) (1) and (2) of this Section (that the spouse be entitled to
all the income and that it be payable annually or more frequently) merely
because the spouse is not entitled to the income from estate assets for the
period before distribution of those assets by the executor, unless the executor
is, by the decedent's will, authorized or directed to delay distribution beyond
the period reasonably required for administration of the decedent's estate."
Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b) 5 (f) (9).
lo In re Lazar's Estate, 139 Misc. 261, 247 N.Y. Supp. 230 (1930).
1 Matter v. Clark, 251 N.Y. 458, 167 N.E. 586 (1929) ; In re Estate of Kantner,
50 N.J. Super. 582, 143 A. 2d 243 (1958).
12 The increased estate tax would be offset somewhat by the increased basis the
assets would acquire for income tax purposes.
13 Suisman v. Eaton, 83 F. 2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1936), affirming 15 F. Supp. 113 (D.
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the property by purchase, rather than by inheritance, and would there-
fore take the fair market value of the property at the time of the
transfer as her basis for it.14
By assuming Guildenstern's estate held at the time of distribution
assets, valued at $75,000, but which had a Federal estate tax value of
$50,000, we see that by using such assets to satisfy the claim of the
widow, the estate would incur a capital gains tax on the appreciation
and Guildenstern's widow would acquire as her basis for this property
the $75,000 value. Conversely, satisfying the claim with depreciated
assets would result in a capital loss to the estate.
It is suggested that the potential capital gains tax, a so-called disad-
vantage when employing such a pecuniary bequest formula clause, has
perhaps been overemphasized. Although a given estate may appreciate
in value as a whole, there are usually some stable or depreciated assets
therein which could be used to satisfy the marital gift. Furthermore,
it is usually the total taxes that the testator seeks to minimize and not
just capital gains taxes.
If the widow is given a definite and certain amount of property as
under this formula clause, the maximum marital deduction is obtained
without any increase in the widow's potential taxable estate, at least dur-
ing the period of administration, because any appreciation during this
period will accrue to the non-marital share. To the extent that the wid-
ow's marital gift can be so limited, her subsequent estate will save ad-
ministration expenses and death taxes, which savings might more than
offset the capital gains taxes, if any, to her husband's estate.
In the event that the husband's estate depreciates in value during
administration, the executor could then elect to use the alternate valua-
tion date which would have the effect of decreasing both the taxable
estate and the marital gift. The latter would again have the effect of
minimizing the widow's potential settlement costs.15
B. PECUNIARY MARITAL GIFT SATISFIED AT FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
VALUES
The second clause to be examined is but a variation of the first in
that the executor is empowered to satisfy legacies with property distri-
Conn. 1935) ; REv. RUL. 56-260, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 325; REV. RUL. 60-87 I.R.B.
1960-10, 18; 4 TAX L. REV. 372 (1949).
14 Comm'r. v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F. 2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948); Treas. Reg. §1.104-4(a) (3).15 It would undoubtedly be advisable to satisfy the marital gift as soon as poss-
ible after the alternate valuation date in order to avoid further susceptibility
to capital gains tax liability resulting from appreciation that might accrue
thereafter. The feasibility of doing this will depend upon whether the ad-justed gross estate can be accurately determined at this time, which in turn
will depend upon whether there are still questions as to the includibility of
certain items in the gross estate, the valuation of items in the gross estate,
and the deductibility of the claims.
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bution in kind, but valued at Federal estate tax values rather than date
of distribution values. This modification evolved in an attempt to avoid
the capital gains tax problem arising under the first clause, and although
there apparently is no definite authority on the point, it is generally
felt that no capital gain or loss would result and the distributee would
take over the cost basis that the assets had in the decedent's estate.16
The following is an example of such a clause:
If my wife survives me, I give to
, as Trustee, an amount equal
to fifty per cent (50%) of the value of my adjusted gross estate
as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes, less the
aggregate amount of marital deductions, if any, allowed for
such tax purposes by reason of property or interests in property
passing or which have passed to my said wife otherwise than
by the terms of this Article of my Will.
My executor may satisfy said bequest wholly or partly in
cash or kind, and select and designate, and assign and convey to
the Trustee of said trust fund, the cash, securities, or other assets
including real estate and interests therein, which shall constitute
said trust fund. Any property so assigned or conveyed in kind to
satisfy said bequest shall be valued for that purpose at the value
thereof as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes. No
asset or proceeds of any asset shall be included in the trust fund
as to which a marital deduction is not allowable if included. Said
bequest shall abate to the extent that it cannot be satisfied in the
manner hereinabove provided. The exercise by my executor of
the authority and discretion given hereunder shall not be subject
to question by any person.
The effect of the marital gift is that it may or may not share in any
fluctuation of value in the property during the administration because,
as the proponents of this clause suggest, the executor could satisfy the
marital gift by distributing in kind assets which exceed in value the
amount of the claim. For instance, if Guildenstern's estate at the time
of distribution held property worth $150,000, but having a Federal es-
tate tax value of only $100,000, the executor could satisfy the gift by
giving this property to the widow. On the other hand, he could just as
well distribute $100,000 in cash to her, or even property which had
depreciated since the time it was valued for Federal estate tax pur-
poses.1 7 But whether the court having jurisdiction over the estate would
allow an executor to make such an unequal distribution is still question-
able. New York, at least, would not, since it has already held in the
Bush case,"" that where the executor had such a power, the allocation
16 CASNEP, ESTATE PLANNING 650 (2d ed. 1956).
3. Id. at 649; Cox, supra note 3, at 930.
:s In re Bush's Will, 2 A.D. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S. 2d 897 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y. 2d
908, 145 N.E. 2d 872 (1957).
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and distribution of the property to the marital deduction gift and the
residuary trust had to be made in such a manner that each would share
proportionally in any appreciation or depreciation of the several se-
curities. The power in the Bush will was decided to be contrary to a
particular New York Statute, 19 but even without such a statute, an exe-
cutor is essentially a trustee20 and must act impartially for the interests
of all the beneficiaries. 21 The allocation of depreciated property to the
marital portion would have the advantage, as mentioned above, of tend-
ing to reduce the amount of assets susceptible to more taxes at the
death of the widow, and perhaps to an even greater extent than under
the first clause examined above. If, however, such an allocation is
allowable, it is apparent that the ultimate amount of the gift the widow
is to receive here depends not only upon the wishes of her deceased
husband, but also upon those of his executor.
Assuming, that by giving the executor this power to distribute at
Federal estate tax values, the capital gains issue is resolved, the ques-
tion remains whether more problems are raised than cured thereby. Is
the executor in effect given the power to fix values? If so, there is the
possibility that this will be deemed a power of appointment, perhaps
incurring gift and estate taxes.2 ' There is the further complication that
the marital deduction gift may be disqualified if the executor is deemed
to have the power to divert property from the spouse.3 Presumably,
such questions would not arise where the executor must make a pro
rata allocation of the several securities as in the Bush case.
Apart from the tax problems, such a clause might very well place
the executor in a position whereby he must act somewhat like an octo-
pus, using many arms to hold off bickering beneficiaries whose interests
are conflicting, and in many cases, making a final decision satisfactory
to none. A not so uncommon example which emphasizes the above is
where the widow is a second wife and the residuary legatees are the
testator's children of a prior marriage. This situation would be further
compounded where a relative is serving as executor or co-executor.' 4
The question now arises that with all the above-mentioned uncer-
tainties, many of which disappear when the fractional share of the
residue formula clause is used, why does a pecuniary formula clause
remain so very popular with draftsmen? Perhaps the most logical
answer is that it is a comparatively simple and uncomplicated formula
clause, both for the attorney to draft and the client to understand. In
19 NEW YORK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, §125-2.
20 Shupe v. Jenks, supra note 8.
21 Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 137 N.W. 778 (1912).
22 CASNER, supra note 16, at 648-650.
2 Treas. Reg. §20.2056(5)-5 (a) (5).
24 Kiley and Golden, A Residue Formula for Maximum Marital Deduction, 89
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 744, 746 (1950).
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the day to day practice of law, the attorney does not usually have the
time to originate his own marital deduction clause and is reluctant to
just "boilerplate" a complex clause suggested by one of the noted au-
thorities in the field. Furthermore, a formula fractional share of the
residue clause such as that which shall be examined next, often evokes
the comment of a client that the complicated language therein is used
only to justify the attorney's fee.
The most widely acclaimed reason for using the pecuniary formula
clause satisfied at estate tax values is because it allows for post-mortem
tax planning.25 The executor is able to allocate assets in such a way as
to obtain the maximum tax benefits in the estates of both the husband
and the wife, usually by diverting from the marital gift those assets
in which appreciation is anticipated or has already accrued. This, of
course, presupposes that an unequal allocation of property is allowable
under the applicable local law, but this in itself might not be an un-
mixed blessing if the questions raised by Mr. Casner are valid.26
C. FRACTIONAL SHARE OF THE RESIDUE
Professor Casner suggests the following as a fractional share form-
ula clause:
If my wife survives me, I hereby give, devise and bequeath
unto , as
Trustee, the following described fractional share of my residu-
ary estate:
The numerator of the fraction shall be the maximum estate
tax marital deduction (allowable in determining the Federal es-
tate tax payable by reason of my death) minus the value for
Federal tax purposes of all items in my gross estate which qual-
ify for said deduction and which pass or have passed to my said
wife (the words 'pass or have passed' shall have the same mean-
ing as such words shall have under the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code in effect at the time of my death) under other
provisions of this will, by right of surviorship with respect to
jointly owned property, under settlement arrangements relating
to life insurance proceeds, or otherwise than under this bequest
and devise (in computing the numerator, the values as finally
determined in the Federal estate tax proceedings shall control) ;
and the denominator of the fraction shall be the value of my
residuary estate, and to the extent that items in my residuary
estate are included in my gross estate, the value at which they
are included in my gross estate shall control in determining the
denominator, and to the extent they are not to included, their
value at the time they would have been valued if they had been
so included, shall control in determining the denominator. 27
Applying the suggested fractional share of the residue clause to
25 Cox, supra note 3, at 931.26 See CASNER, supra note 16, at 648-650.
27 CASNER, supra note 6, at 190.
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Guildenstern's estate, the numerator of the fraction would be $100,000,
derived by subtracting from the "maximum estate tax marital deduc-
tion" of $150,000, the value of all items "which pass or have passed
to my said wife ... otherwise than under this bequest," which under
the assumed facts would be $50,000. The denominator would be the
value of the residuary estate, or $250,000. This fraction, 100,000/250,-
000 or 2/5, as applied to the distributive assets would produce a marital
gift of $100,000 (2/5 of $250,000) which, when added to the other
assets passing to the widow, $50,000, would equal the maximum mari-
tal deduction. If, however, the residuary estate increased in value to
$300,000, two-fifths thereof would be $120,000 and the ultimate amount
of property received by the wife then would be $170,000; conversely,
a decrease to $200,000 would make her total share only $130,000. Un-
der each of these three conditions, the residuary legatees would take
the balance of the estate less taxes of about $30,000 (approximate
Federal estate tax of $17,500, Wisconsin inheritance taxes of $12,500),
their shares being $120,000, $150,000 and $90,000 respectively. This
same proportionate sharing of the distributive property might occur
under the pecuniary bequest formula using Federal estate tax values,
but so far, only New York has interpreted the executor's power to dis-
tribute at Federal estate tax values as being a mandatory direction tor
a pro rata allocation, whereas under this fractional share of the residue
formula, it is mandatory by the terms of the will itself.
28
The fractional share of the residue formula clause apparently re-
moves virtually all of the objections raised against the pecuniary be-
quest formulas:
1. The assets received by the widow are acquired through
inheritance so that unquestionably there is no capital gain or loss
upon distribution when the assets are distributed on an aliquot
basis and the distributee acquires the estate's basis for the pro-
perty.
29
2. The widow automatically shares in any increase or de-
crease in value of the probate assets during the administration."
3. Some of the temptation to elect a high valuation date in
order to increase the marital deduction is removed because the
marital and non-marital portions share ratably in any accretions.
4. The executor cannot be deemed to possess a power of
appointment as there is no necessity for any provision requiring
the distribution of assets at Federal estate tax values. Neither
can the executor be considered as having the power to divert
assets from the spouse, as distributions under a fractional share
formula must be made according to the fraction so as to at least
provide dollar proration.
28 See In re Bush's Will, supra note 18.
2 9




5. Because the marital and non-marital portions share ratably
dollarwise when residuary property does appreciate, the executor
is not placed in the uncomfortable position which might occur
when the executor distributes at Federal estate tax values under
a pecuniary bequest clause and thereby has the ability to favor
one share over another.
6. The intent of the testator cannot be frustrated by the
actions of the executor.
Although the fractional share clause seems to have these distinct
advantages over a pecuniary bequest clause, it may not be without its
own failings. One of the arguments against the use of such a clause is
its inflexibility because it removes the possibility of post-mortem plan-
ning as the executor is unable to alter the amounts of the respective
shares or even the assets therein as each item in the residue apparently
should be divided on a pro rata basis.31
Professor Casner suggests two methods of overcoming the last
objection. The testator can make a specific bequest of property he
decides should not be split between the marital and non-marital shares,
but if the property is likely to increase significantly in value before his
death, such a bequest might hinder the operation of the formula. In
such a case, as an alternative, the executor could be given the "discre-
tion on distribution to allocate such property to the non-marital share
and to transfer to the marital share from the non-marital share pro-
perty of equivalent value in place thereof." 2
Such a discretionary power, and also a mandatory power to exclude
from the marital share those assets appearing in the gross estate which
would not qualify for the marital deduction if so included, might
cause a new complication, however. The problem is this-if the exe-
cutor should allocate one asset to the marital share, and another asset
having an equal value at that time, but a different basis to the estate,
to the non-marital share, perhaps it will be considered a taxable ex-
change.3
3
To illustrate, if Guildenstern's executor allocated to the marital
share a block of GM stock worth $36,000 and having a basis of $30,000,
and IBM stock to the non-marital share also worth $36,000 at the time
of allocation, but with only a $24,000 basis, the Commissioner might
claim that this was a taxable exchange. This is because the beneficiaries
would not receive equal benefits in that if we assume that each issue
is then sold and a 25% capital gains tax subtracted therefrom, the net
to the widow would be $34,500 whereby the non-marital legatees would
realize only $33,000.
81 Peeler, Unsuspected Realization of Profit in Estates and Trusts, 98 TRUSTS
AND EsTATEs 1191, 1193 (1959) ; CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1960 SUPPLEMENT
201 (2d ed. 1956).
32 CASNER, Id. at 209.
33 PFLER, Supra note 31, at 1192.
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According to the Regulations, 34 a distribution in kind may result in
taxable gain if (1) in satisfaction of a right to receive a distribution in
a specific dollar amount or (2) in satisfaction of a right to receive spe-
cific property other than that actually distributed. We have already
seen an example of the first in connection with a distribution under
the first clause examined above. The second seems to assume in effect
that there is something like an "exchange of property for other pro-
perty differing materially either in kind or in extent '" which is a realiz-
ing taxable event under Section 1001 (a) of the Code.36 But whether
an unequal allocation of assets by an executor can be treated as either
a taxable exchange or a dollar claim3T from one share in favor of the
other, depends in part upon what interest the beneficiaries had in the
property prior to its allocation.3
Real estate, in Wisconsin, descends to the heirs or devisees upon
the decedent's death3 9 whereas legal title to personalty passes to the
executor.40 Whether the beneficiaries acquire sufficient interests in per-
sonalty to constitute a claim before distribution seems uncertain.
In one Wisconsin decision, the court required a personal representa-
tive to convey his legal title in certain personalty in accordance with
the beneficiary's prior dealings with her equitable interests in that pro-
perty.41 On the other hand, the court has also held that residuary
legatees take as tenants in common 42 but did not go on to decide whether
each tenant in common has an undivided interest in each of the assets
of the residue.
Two other authorities would seem to indicate that a non-aliquot
distribution would not create a taxable capital gain. In O.D. 667, 3
Cum. BULL. 52, there was a residuary bequest in equal portions to
three legatees. Cash and securities were distributed unevenly, but it
was held that the distribution created no capital gain to the estate and
the distributees acquired the estate's basis for the property. In the
Long case, it was decided that a joint partition deed which divided
residuary realty and personalty nonratably was not a taxable exchange.4 3
It has been suggested, however, that these decisions might not still
be healthy "in light of their age." 44
"Until and unless this question has been resolved favorably, it is
34 Treas. Reg. §1.661 (a) -2 (f).
35 Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1 (a).
36 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1001 (a).
37 CASNE , supra note 31, at 209; Kenan v. Comm'r. 114 F. 2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
38 PFELER, supra note 31, at 1192.
n Estate of Rieman, 272 Wis. 378, 75 N.W. 2d 564 (1956).
40 Will of Krause, 240 Wis. 72, 2 N.W. 2d 733 (1942); Shupe v. Jenks, supra
note 8.
41 McKeigue v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 130 Wis. 543, 110 N.W. 384 (1907).
42 Estate of Hoermann, 234 Wis. 130, 290 N.W. 608 (1940).
43 Long v. Comm'r., 35 B.T.A. 95 (1936).
44 CASNER, supra note 31, at 210.
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advisable to make distributions on an aliquot basis to the fullest extent
possible," 45 which in fact is feasible in the majority of estates and
limits the significance of this question to unusual fact situations.
A number of variations of the fractional share of the residue
formula clause have been suggested which should be considered here.
Perhaps the most refined of these variations from the standpoint of
its actual operation is that clause suggested in the early days of the
marital deduction by Messrs. Kiley and Golden which reads as follows:
I give the entire residue of my estate remaining after the
payment of all taxes as provided under Article One of my will to
my trustee hereinafter named as trustee of separate trusts to be
designated as Trust A and Trust B. If my wife survive me,
Trust A shall be comprised of that fractional share of the resid-
uary estate passing under this Article which will equal one-half
of my adjusted gross estate as finally determined under the In-
ternal Revenue Code for Federal estate tax purposes, less the
aggregate marital deduction allowable for property or interests
in property which pass or have already passed to my said wife
under any other Article of this will, by operation of law, through
insurance contracts or otherwise. Trust B shall be comprised of
the remaining fractional share of the residuary estate or of the
entire residue if my wife does not survive me. Such fractional
shares of residue shall be determined on the basis of final Fed-
eral estate tax values.4 6
When using this clause, the authors suggest that a direction be made
that all estate, inheritance and succession taxes be paid as administra-
tion expenses (note the reference in the clause to Article One), and
that any property, which if left to the widow would not qualify for
the marital deduction, be specifically bequeathed to the non-marital
trust. It is further suggested that any assets which might be unsuitable
to splitting between the trusts be specifically bequeathed to one trust or
the other.
The main difference between this clause and others is in its definition
of the residue. Defining the residue as an "after-tax" residue seems
most logical in that the fraction is then applied at distribution to the
true residue held by the executor. The division could also be made by
the trustee after the executor has placed the final residuary estate in his
hands. This seems particularly logical in Wisconsin where the trustee
is likely to already be holding unallocated life insurance proceeds. 47
Mathematically, the "after-tax" clause in effect allows the widow
to share in any appreciation which might occur in the assets in fact
used to pay taxes during or at the end of the administration of the es-
45 PEER, supra note 31, at 1193.
46 KiLEY AND GoLDEi, supra note 24, at 794.
47 WIs. STATs. §206.52(2) (1959).
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tate.48 In most cases, this mathematical factor should not be too signifi-
cant.
By also excluding non-qualifying assets from the defined residue,
the possibility of a dollar claim in favor of the marital share, as a re-
sult of a mandatory direction, is removed. 49 But the problem raised
above in regard to certain assets which do not readily lend themselves
to division between the two portions, such as real estate or stock in a
close corporation, where the fluctuating values of the property are
likely to distort the formula, may not be cured by making a specific
bequest thereof. In such a case, the draftsman must decide for him-
self as to the advisability of allowing an executor to allocate property
in his discretion to the share best suited to receive it.
It should be observed that the fractional share clause suggested
herein differs from that drafted by Messrs. Kiley and Golden in that it
employs the numerator-denominator method of defining the fraction.
As can be seen by working through the Kiley and Golden clause, it is
somewhat difficult to actually come up with a definite fraction, although
the clause must operate in terms thereof. With Guildenstern, Trust A
would receive a fractional share equal to one-half of the adjusted gross
estate, $150,000, less the property passing otherwise to the wife, $50,000,
or $150,000 minus $50,000. This seems more like an amount than a
fraction whereas under the numerator-denominator method, there is no
doubt but that the language spells out an actual fraction to be used by
the executor. Perhaps, therefore, it would be advisable to combine the
"after-tax", "after undesirable items" clause with the numerator-de-
nominator language in order to come up with as refined a fractional
share of the residue clause as possible. An additional wrinkle which
might be added for use in the State of Wisconsin is to have the trustee
make the division after he has received the true residuary estate from
the executor. A clause embodying these many elements might read as
follows:
48 In the "before tax" example used above on page 540, when the assets appreci-
ated in value, the computations were as follows:




Less: Marital share $120,000
Taxes 30,000 -150,000
$150,000
Similar computations under an after-tax formula would be:




Less: Marital share -122,727
$147,273
49 CASNER, supra note 31, at 208.
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COMMENTS
I devise and bequeath all of my residuary estate (being all
property, wherever situated, in which I may have any interest at
the time of my death not otherwise effectively disposed of by my
will or codicil, but not including any property over which I may
have power of appointment) remaining after payment of all
taxes as directed in Article I to my trustees hereinafter named,
upon the following trusts:
1. If my wife survives me, my trustees shall divide my said
residuary estate, together with the proceeds of insurance on my
life and any other death benefit payable (without specific refer-
ence to either of said trusts) to my said trustees (all of which
property shall be known as my trust estate), remaining after pay-
ment of all taxes as directed in Article I, into two trusts, each of
which shall be held and administered as a separate trust:
(a) One trust, called the Marital Trust, shall comprise
that share of my said trust estate required to obtain for my
estate a full marital deduction after taxes, which share shall
be determined by a fraction-
(i) The numerator of which shall be the value of the
maximum marital deduction allowable in determining the
Federal estate tax payable by my estate under the laws in
effect at the time of my death diminished by the value of
all other property included in my estate for Federal estate
tax purposes which qualifies for the said marital deduction
and which passes or has passed to my wife and to the
Marital Trust either under any other provisions of this
will or in any other manner, and
(ii) The denominator of which shall be the value of
my trust estate.
(b) The other trust, called the Family Trust, shall com-
prise the remaining share of my said trust estate.
(c) In computing the numerator and denominator of said
fraction, the values as finally determined in the final Federal
estate tax proceedings shall control. The assets distributed
pursuant to the provisions of this Article, however, shall be
valued for distribution purposes at their fair market values
at the time or times of actual distribution to the respective
trusts. My trustees, in their sole discretion, shall determine
the assets to be transferred to the Marital Trust.
2. If my wife shall not survive me, the Family Trust shall
comprise my entire said trust estate.50
CONCLUSION
The main differences between the above clauses seem to be in their
effect upon appreciation or depreciation of estate property and the
capital gains tax liability resulting therefrom. The pecuniary gift, satis-
fied at date of distribution values, definitely incurs a capital gain or
loss to the estate when the assets fluctuate in value, but what would
50 This clause was composed by the author and Charles G. Carpenter, Assistant
Cashier in the Trust Department of Marshall & Ilsley Bank and member of
Wisconsin Bar.
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appear to be the best argument for its use, namely the overall savings
in the estates of both spouses, is a very persuasive one. The fractional
share of the residue clause, on the other hand, does not incur any capi-
tal gains taxes (except possibly where a non-aliquot distribution is
made) but does allow the widow to share in any increase or decrease
in value of the property in the hands of the fiduciary. The pecuniary
bequest, satisfied at Federal estate tax values, is somewhat of a hybrid
in that it is purported not to require pro rata allocation of increments
or decrements, nor to incur any capital gains taxes, but it rests on an
uncertain legal foundation in both respects.
One point is certain, however. The use of any one of the formula
clauses requires first, a careful analysis of the total estate of the client
in light of his testamentary desires, and second, a thorough knowledge
of the effect each type of clause would produce in that estate., Expert
assistance is suggested wherever an uncertainty arises as mistakes in
this area are irreparable.
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